Intelligence
Explorer.
Investigue vulnerabilidades por identificador, produto afetado ou descrição. Use severidade, CVSS e EPSS juntos para orientar a prioridade.
Grupos & malware emergente
Atividade pública observada em leak sites e repositórios comunitários. Alegações de vítimas não representam confirmação independente de incidente.
Sem famílias correlacionadas no recorte recente.
FONTES: RANSOMWARE.LIVE + MALWAREBAZAAR / ABUSE.CH · CACHE 1H
A flaw was found in NetworkManager-vpnc, a VPN plugin for NetworkManager. A local unprivileged user can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a newline character into the CA-File path. This manipulation allows the user to execute arbitrary commands as the root user, leading to local privilege escalation.
A flaw was found in NetworkManager-vpnc. This vulnerability allows a local unprivileged user to escalate privileges to root. By injecting a newline character into the VPN username field, an attacker can manipulate the vpnc configuration to execute an arbitrary program with root privileges when the malicious VPN connection is activated.
A flaw was found in NetworkManager-fortisslvpn, the FortiSSLVPN plugin for NetworkManager. The nm-fortisslvpn-service improperly handles carriage-return/line-feed (CR/LF) characters in VPN connection profile credentials. A local unprivileged user can exploit this by crafting a malicious VPN profile to inject additional configuration directives. This can lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges when the crafted VPN connection is activated.
A flaw was found in NetworkManager-sstp, the SSTP VPN plugin for NetworkManager. A local unprivileged user can exploit this vulnerability by embedding special characters, known as shell metacharacters, into VPN connection profile fields such as CA certificate or proxy settings. These unescaped characters are then processed by the `pppd` daemon, which runs with root privileges, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated permissions when a malicious VPN connection is activated.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, a security filter that protects Zammad's AI Agent configuration can be bypassed by entering specially crafted text into one of an AI Agent's fields. An administrator with permission to create or edit AI Agents could exploit this to run arbitrary commands on the server that hosts Zammad, potentially reading, modifying, or destroying all data stored on that server. No interaction from other users is needed; the malicious code runs automatically the next time the affected AI Agent processes a ticket. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, the legacy destroy_form action on AttachmentsController deletes UploadCache Store records based solely on a user-supplied form_id without verifying that the requesting user owns those records. An authenticated attacker who learns another user's pending-upload UUID can silently remove temporary file uploads before the victim submits their ticket or article. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. In 7.0.2 and 7.1.0, zammad's session management for websocket and long-polling connections is susceptible to a path traversal attack. Session identifiers supplied by the client are insufficiently validated before being used to construct internal file paths. When the file-based session store is active (the default configuration), an authenticated attacker can manipulate the session identifier to reference locations outside the intended storage directory, leading to the deletion of arbitrary files and directories on the server. Exploitation requires only a low-privilege authenticated session and a single crafted request. Instances configured to use the Redis-based session store are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 7.0.3 and 7.1.1.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2 and 7.1.0, zammad's HTML sanitizer (HtmlSanitizer::Strict) blocks external URLs in to prevent remote content loading, but the srcset attribute, also allowlisted for , is not subject to the same check. This oversight allows an attacker to embed arbitrary external URLs in the srcset attribute just by sending an e-mail, effectively bypassing the external content protection. When an agent views the ticket containing the malicious srcset, the browser will silently load the attacker-controlled URL, resulting in the leakage of the agent's IP address, User-Agent, Referer, and the exact time the ticket was viewed. HtmlSanitizer::Strict got extended to block external URLs in the srcset attribute of tags. This was done to prevent tracking pixels and external content loading, which could compromise user privacy. This issue is fixed in versions 7.0.2 and 7.1.0.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, during federated authentication (OAuth/OIDC/SAML), a profile image URL from the external identity provider is fetched without verifying the target address. An actor who controls their profile at a connected provider may cause the server to connect to internal network locations. Response timing and error patterns differ between reachable and unreachable targets, allowing internal service probing. Worker processes may be blocked for several seconds per request. Requires a configured external authentication provider where the actor can modify their profile image URL. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2 and 7.1.0, this issue concerns a lack of discursive validation within the authorization cascade. It has been determined that the system-level enforcement of access restrictions during the initialization of new identity objects exhibits a discrepancy: Under specific conditions, the granular restrictions of the access key being used are overridden by the latent authorization authority of the parent account. Consequently, this means that the intended separation of functional areas is nullified, resulting in an uncontrolled expansion of administrative discretion. Due to this potential integrity breach of the entire trust environment, an immediate evaluation of the authorization hierarchies is imperative. Impact An attacker can create new administrator accounts despite token restrictions. This grants full access to all system data (tickets, customers, configuration) and allows the attacker to take complete control of the Zammad instance. Abuse Scenario The vulnerability stems from a lack of synergy between the token-based authorization logic and the target system's functional authorization hierarchy, which allows for iterative escalation of the privileged access context. This issue is fixed in versions 7.0.2 and 7.1.0.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, vulnerability in Zammad's HTML sanitization allows injection of specific HTML elements into ticket bodies. When another user views the crafted ticket, the injected element can trigger a logout request, terminating the viewer's session. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.1, a low-privilege authenticated user may inject arbitrary HTML markup, including JavaScript event handlers, into a ticket title via the standard ticket creation workflow. The title is persisted without sanitization. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.1.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, an authorization bypass vulnerability was found that allows an authenticated agent to read knowledge base answer content they should not be able to access. The vulnerable GraphQL mutation is meant to transform a knowledge base answer suggestion so it can be inserted into the ticket editor, but it only checks if the user has the ticket.agent permission. Checking the authorization to the knowledge base answer itself is missing. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, a broken access control vulnerability exists in Zammad's GraphQL API. An authenticated user can access taskbar item data belonging to another user by crafting a request with the target user's taskbar identifier. The taskbar feature stores transient state for active user sessions, including auto-saved ticket drafts. Under certain conditions, the authorization check for taskbar item access is not enforced, allowing a user to read another user's taskbar item data. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, summary In Zammad's inbound PGP email processing, the return value of the gpg verification call was silently discarded. Regardless of whether gpg reported a valid, invalid, or missing signature, the handler unconditionally wrote sign: { success: true, comment: "Good signature" } to the article's security preferences. Impact Any sender could tamper with the body of a multipart/signed PGP email, or craft a message with an entirely fabricated or mismatched signature, and Zammad would display it to the recipient as cryptographically verified with a "Good signature" label. Users and agents relying on Zammad's signature indicator to confirm message authenticity and integrity would be misled into trusting modified or forged content. The vulnerability affects all inbound PGP-signed emails processed while the PGP integration is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, this vulnerability breaks normal ticket isolation boundaries between agents. Any authenticated agent, even one with no active tickets assigned to them, can view the titles, status, labels, and URL links of GitHub/GitLab issues attached to any ticket in the system. This allows an internal user to systematically view GitHub/GitLab issue data linked by other agents or administrators across the organization by simply querying random or sequential ticket IDs. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.2.
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, summary An unauthenticated request to POST /api/v1/import/otrs/import_check blocks a Zammad request worker for roughly two minutes. The import_check and import_status actions are missing the setup_done_response guard that other actions in the same controller carry, so they execute on fully set-up production instances. The action enters a retry loop against a blank OTRS endpoint, sleeping for 30 s + 45 s between attempts. Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker denies service to a production Zammad instance. Each request costs almost nothing and forces ~115 seconds of server-side blocking. A few requests per second saturate the Puma worker pool. The condition persists as long as the traffic continues. No account, valid import configuration, or target knowledge beyond the hostname is needed. CSRF token is trivially obtained from any prior GET response. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2.
A security flaw has been discovered in zhistaredu StarTraining up to 3.8.1. The affected element is an unknown function of the file SecurityConfig.java of the component api-docs Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in missing authentication. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
A vulnerability was identified in zhistaredu StarTraining up to 3.8.1. Impacted is the function anonymous of the file /druid/index.html of the component Druid Console. Such manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
A vulnerability was determined in zhistaredu StarTraining up to 3.8.1. This issue affects the function UserLoginService.createToken of the file application.yml of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation of the argument user_id/company_id causes use of hard-coded password. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
A vulnerability has been found in Zhonglun CloudPos up to 3.0.1.76. This issue affects the function OpenLocalBrowser of the file ZlPos/ZlPos/Bizlogic/JSBridge.cs of the component JSBridge. Such manipulation of the argument url leads to code injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Missing Authorization in the askpass escape code handler in kitty from 0.25.0 before 0.49.0 allows a local user other than the one running the terminal to obtain the text typed into a prompt that kitty itself displays, because handle_remote_askpass() in kitty/window.py opens the POSIX shared memory object named in the escape code, parses a prompt definition out of it, and writes the user's answer back into an object of that same name, without at any point checking that the object is owned by the user running kitty or that its permissions exclude other users. The equivalent consumer of the same SharedMemory class in the ssh kitten performs exactly that check; the askpass path did not. The handler is reached through a device control string processed from the byte stream of the window, so the attacker must also cause bytes of their choosing to be displayed by the victim's terminal. Where the POSIX shared memory namespace is shared between the two users, a second local user can create an object with permissions that allow the victim to read and write it, cause the victim's kitty to render a prompt of the attacker's choosing, including a masked password prompt, and read the typed secret back out of the object afterwards. The prompt text is additionally passed to the display without control character sanitisation, so it can overwrite the warning line kitty prints above it. The answer is written by reopening an object of that name when the user answers, rather than through the handle already held. This results in disclosure of a secret typed by the victim to a second local user, and does not require any privilege on the victim's account.
Use After Free in the drag source path of the drag and drop protocol in kitty from 0.47.0 before 0.49.0 allows a program writing to the terminal to cause the terminal to read from and write to freed heap memory, because drag_remote_file_data() in kitty/dnd.c holds a DragRemoteItem pointer into an array it does not own, calls toplevel_data_for_drag() or subdir_data_for_drag(), and then continues to use that pointer. Those helpers, and add_payload() and populate_dir_entries() which they call, report errors through the abrt() macro, which expands to cancel_drag() followed by a plain return, and cancel_drag() calls drag_free_offer(), which frees the array the pointer refers to. The helpers return void, so the caller receives no indication that the teardown happened, and proceeds to call all_children_complete() on the freed pointer, which dereferences it, and then to write through it. That dereference is guarded by a local flag that is set when the request carries no payload and announces no further data, which is the same condition that selects the finalisation block of add_payload(), so the error paths in that block reach it: a create that fails because an entry of the same name already exists, because the client may declare two entries with one name and the create operations use O_CREAT with O_EXCL and symlinkat(), a mkdirat() failure other than EEXIST, and the directory entry allocation paths. Both branches reach it. In the top level branch the caller's pointer is never cleared, so clearing the owning structure's own pointers during teardown does not help. In the sub directory branch subdir_data_for_drag() sets the caller's pointer to NULL on entry and assigns it only after its own last error path, so its own aborts leave the caller with NULL and are stopped by a null check, but it then calls add_payload() with that pointer set, and an abort there leaves the caller holding a freed child node inside the item tree, which drag_free_offer() frees by recursion. This results in undefined behaviour in the terminal process, reachable from the byte stream of any program running in the window.
A malicious txtar could escape the intended execution context and force arbitrary writes to the playground host's trusted filesystem. Disjointly, one of the three possible paths to invoke go vet on the playground host did not correctly restrict the execution environment. This permitted a Go process to make a read for an environment configuration file rooted in the playground host's $HOME. Together, a well-crafted go env file and the go vet invocation could lead to remote code execution in the playground host itself. This does not affect users of go.dev/play directly; however, it may affect independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground.