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Gitea's repository markup endpoint resolves same-repository pull request references without enforcing the viewer's Pull Requests permission. A member with only Wiki access to a private repository can submit a markup preview request and retrieve a private pull request's title and state icon despite lacking Issues and Pull Requests access. This exposes pull request metadata across repository unit permissions.

Gitea's pull request review notifier does not attach the pull request to the Actions notification, so the fork workflow approval gate does not recognize the run as originating from a fork. Review comment and review approval or rejection events can consequently load workflow code from the fork head and run it on the base repository's runners without the required maintainer approval. This allows execution of fork-controlled workflow code across the intended approval boundary.

Gitea's organization-list API does not enforce the read:organization token scope. A token limited to another category, such as read:misc, can retrieve organization metadata visible to its owner. For a site administrator's token, the response can include Limited and private organizations, bypassing the intended restriction on the token's delegated access.

Gitea's shared comparison helper omits the token repository-access check used when updating pull requests. A public-only token with read:repository scope can route a comparison or pull request creation through a public base repository and retrieve commit history and diffs from a private head repository accessible to the token owner. This bypasses the token's public-only restriction; it does not remove the account's underlying repository permission checks.

Gitea creates server-side Git hook directories and scripts with mode 0777 and relies on the process umask to restrict access. With a permissive umask such as 0000 or 0002, another local user who can reach the repository storage may modify a hook or add an executable to a writable hook directory. A later Git operation can execute that file as the Gitea service account.

Gitea's repository migration API accepts a public-only token when the request specifies creation of a private repository. A delegated token intended to operate only on public resources can create a private repository and migration task under the authorizing account or an organization where that user has the necessary permissions. The ordinary private repository-creation route rejects the same token, but the migration path omits that restriction.

Gitea's organization repository-creation API requires write:organization but omits the write:repository token scope enforced by other repository-creation routes. A personal access token or OAuth application token without repository-write scope can therefore create organization-owned repositories if the authorizing user has permission to do so. This bypasses the token's delegated scope boundary while remaining subject to the user's organization permissions.

Gitea's user SSH and GPG key-list API endpoints omit the profile visibility check applied by their web equivalents. A restricted account can retrieve public keys, key titles, fingerprints, and GPG-embedded email addresses belonging to Limited-visibility users. The disclosure concerns public key material and associated metadata, not private cryptographic keys.

Gitea's API and web issue-search paths do not treat restricted accounts as anonymous viewers when evaluating Limited-visibility repository owners. A restricted user can search and retrieve issue titles and bodies that should be hidden by the owner's visibility policy. Keyword matching can also reveal that hidden issue content or comments contain a supplied term.

Gitea's activity-feed and contribution-heatmap API handlers do not apply the profile visibility check for restricted accounts viewing Limited-visibility users. A restricted user can retrieve activity records and contribution timestamps that the corresponding profile routes deny. Exposed activity can include repository names, commit messages, and issue or pull request events associated with qualifying public-repository activity.

Gitea enforces first-time fork contributor approval by blocking jobs, but some job transition and dispatch paths do not re-check the run's approval requirement. A separate run sharing a job-level concurrency group can cancel a pending job and cause its blocked sibling jobs to be re-emitted and dispatched without approval. This allows unreviewed workflow code to execute on self-hosted runners; fork secrets remain withheld and the run token remains read-only.

For pull request events, Gitea reads workflow definitions from the pull request head and posts a synthetic skipped status when workflow branch or path filters exclude execution. A fork pull request author can supply a workflow matching a required status context but deliberately prevent it from running. Because skipped statuses count as success, branch protection or organization-required workflow checks can appear satisfied without the mandated workflow executing; no runner or maintainer approval is required for this path.

Gitea's user organization-list API includes Limited-visibility organizations for authenticated restricted accounts without applying the visibility restriction enforced by the single-organization endpoint. A restricted user can list a known user's public organization memberships and retrieve limited organizations' names, descriptions, and avatars. This exposes organization metadata that should be hidden from the requesting account.

Gitea's package registry grants authenticated users read access to packages owned by Limited-visibility users without excluding restricted accounts. A restricted user can enumerate and download those packages despite the visibility policy that should prevent this access. The issue affects user-owned package registries and exposes package contents across the intended authorization boundary.

Gitea's collaborative-owner authorization path for reading cross-repository reusable workflows does not exclude fork pull request runs. An approved fork workflow targeting a private repository can read workflow files from another private repository that trusts the base repository's owner through collaborative-owner configuration. The issue exposes private reusable workflow contents at caller-selected Git refs; it does not itself grant write access or code execution in the other repository.

Gitea's Swift package parser limits each manifest to 128 KiB but does not limit the number of manifests or their aggregate size before reading them into memory. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a highly compressed archive containing many manifests, causing allocations far larger than the uploaded archive. This can exhaust memory, terminate the process, or cause request failures.

Gitea parses Alpine package uploads before enforcing package-size quotas and does not bound the decompressed .PKGINFO data or its dependency and provides entry counts. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a small, highly compressed archive that causes disproportionately large memory allocations during parsing and metadata generation. On memory-constrained deployments, this can terminate the process or otherwise disrupt availability.

Gitea's initial GitLab migration version probe uses an HTTP client without a timeout and does not attach the migration task's cancellation context. An authenticated user who can start migrations can target an attacker-controlled server that keeps the response open indefinitely. The request continues after task cancellation and can exhaust the migration worker pool, preventing other migrations from progressing.

Gitea's OneDev migration downloader reads the entire remote version response into memory without a size limit and uses a client without a timeout. An authenticated user who can start a repository migration can direct it to an attacker-controlled OneDev-compatible server returning an oversized or never-ending response. This can consume memory and hold migration workers, impairing service availability.

Gitea's repository-side team-link API allows a repository administrator who is not an organization owner to attach organization teams to a repository despite RepoAdminChangeTeamAccess being disabled. The endpoint does not enforce the organization's restriction on repository administrators changing team access. This allows unauthorized changes to which organization teams receive repository access.

Gitea's Jupyter notebook renderer inserts the notebook's language_info.name metadata into a CSS class attribute while disabling sanitization and rendering directly in the main document without an iframe sandbox. A malicious repository notebook can supply multiple CSS classes that create a viewport-covering overlay and intercept clicks when another user views it. The reported impact is UI redress; script execution was not demonstrated.

Gitea's Org-mode markup renderer processes INCLUDE directives supplied to the repository markup endpoint without preventing access to server-side files. An unauthenticated attacker can use a suitable public repository to read files accessible to the Gitea service account. If the disclosed files include app.ini and its INTERNAL_TOKEN, the attacker can chain the disclosure with internal logger access to modify a Git hook and execute commands as the Gitea service account.

Gitea's starred-repository and tracked-time API endpoints do not re-check current repository permissions before returning data associated with the requesting user. A user whose access to a private repository has been revoked can still retrieve repository metadata through /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles through /api/v1/user/times. The disclosure depends on relationships or tracked-time entries created before access was revoked.

util-linux is a random collection of Linux utilities. In util-linux 2.17 through 2.41.6 and 2.42 through 2.42.3, and in 2.42.4 when the legacy `mount(2)` path is used without `/proc`, restricted non-root `mount` requests validate an `/etc/fstab` target before the mount operation re-resolves that pathname. A local low-privileged user authorized by an fstab `user` or `users` entry whose target has an attacker-writable ancestor can use `renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)` to swap a path component and redirect an authorized mount to a root-owned location, such as mounting attacker-controlled content over `/etc/sudoers.d`, and thereby gain root privileges. Versions 2.41.5 and 2.42.2 pin targets for the new mount API, and 2.42.4 pins legacy targets through `/proc/self/fd`; the documented legacy fallback without `/proc` remains affected.