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Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not sufficiently validate the content of an uploaded backup, and allowed an administrator to influence how the application loaded it. An authenticated administrator could potentially use this to execute arbitrary code on the gateway as the underlying service account.

A user-provisioning interface in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to grant the role being assigned. An administrator whose delegated permissions covered role changes alone could therefore raise an account to full system-administrator privileges.

An identity-verification weakness in Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway allowed the gateway to act on the Kiteworks platform on behalf of a user it had not authenticated, and to provision a platform account for an identity it did not already know. A remote, unauthenticated sender could potentially exploit this to obtain control of a platform account.

An XML parser used by Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not restrict external entity references. Where an optional, non-default message-processing feature is enabled, a remote and unauthenticated sender could potentially use a crafted message to read files accessible to the gateway service account, including cryptographic key material and credentials, and have them sent to a destination they control.

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) weakness in Kiteworks Core could allow an administrator holding only a single, narrowly scoped delegated permission to store crafted content that later executes arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated session of a System Administrator who views the affected page. This could have permitted the lower-privileged administrator to escalate to full administrative control of the tenant, including the creation of a new administrative account.

The sandbox that isolates document conversion on a Kiteworks appliance did not fully confine the code running inside it. Code already executing within that sandbox could potentially escape its confinement and act with the privileges of the service account that runs the application, which could allow an attacker in that position to read or modify application data and configuration, or to disrupt the service on the affected appliance.

A Kiteworks appliance setup interface did not enforce authentication once the appliance had completed initial configuration. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the appliance could read and modify a limited set of setup records, including a contact name and email address captured during initial configuration.

A Kiteworks appliance setup interface did not confine a user-supplied file path to its intended directory, which could allow an unauthenticated attacker to write a file to any location writable by the affected service account, potentially compromising the integrity of the appliance or rendering it unavailable until an operator intervenes. Exploitation requires network access to the affected interface, which is not reachable on a fully configured appliance in its default configuration; reaching it depends on either the transient window while an appliance is first being provisioned or a non-default appliance configuration.

Kiteworks did not correctly enforce which roles a shared folder's manager was permitted to assign. In a default configuration, an authenticated user holding the Manager role on a folder could grant the Owner role to themselves or to other members of that folder.

A form-rendering interface in the Advanced Forms component is reachable without authentication so that published forms can be displayed to anonymous visitors, but it returned more data than the form itself required. Anyone who knew the web address of a published form could potentially retrieve the form owner's Kiteworks account profile, including personal details, along with parts of the deployment's configuration settings; no passwords, authentication tokens, or multi-factor secrets were exposed.

A privilege escalation vulnerability in Kiteworks could have allowed an attacker who had already obtained code execution on one node of a clustered Kiteworks deployment to run operating system commands with elevated privileges on another node of the same cluster. Insufficient input validation in an internal cluster management function let attacker-supplied values reach a privileged execution context; exploitation requires existing access to a node in the cluster, and the affected function is not reachable from outside the cluster.

A path traversal weakness in an optional, non-default administrative feature allowed an authenticated administrator to move files to unintended locations outside the feature's designated directory. This could potentially be leveraged to execute arbitrary code on the underlying system.

A local privilege escalation vulnerability in Kiteworks could have allowed an attacker with an existing shell under a low-privileged service account to escalate to root privileges on the appliance.

On deployments where the remote-support capability is licensed and enabled, an authenticated System Administrator who also possessed the key protecting the submitted data could redirect the underlying system's outbound support connection to a destination of their choosing. That destination could then have operating-system commands executed on the node and receive their output, potentially resulting in remote code execution with the privileges of a local service account.

-A weakness could have allowed an authenticated Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway administrator to write a file outside its intended location and cause the application to execute it, potentially resulting in remote code execution as the underlying service account.

Kiteworks Core did not correctly validate a parameter submitted to the password reset workflow. An unauthenticated attacker who knew the email address of a user with a locally stored password could potentially reset that account's password without access to the emailed reset link and then authenticate as that user, including where the account holds administrative privileges.

A command injection vulnerability in Kiteworks could allow a high-privileged authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary operating-system commands as root on the affected appliance node. Successful exploitation requires an administrative account with elevated privileges.

A privilege escalation vulnerability in Kiteworks could allow an attacker who has already obtained code execution as an unprivileged backend service account on the appliance to escalate to root. A privileged routine did not safely handle a filesystem path that the lower-privileged account could influence, allowing the attacker to cause a root-owned operation to run arbitrary commands with the highest privileges. Exploitation requires existing local access to that service account.

A privilege escalation vulnerability in Kiteworks could allow an attacker who has already obtained code execution as an unprivileged backend service account on the appliance to escalate to root and run arbitrary commands with the highest privileges. Exploitation requires existing local access to that service account.

Kiteworks did not enforce the maximum permitted value for a configurable security-policy setting. An authenticated administrator could set this value outside its intended range so that the associated control never activated, while the control continued to appear enabled in the administrative interface and audit log, allowing it to be silently rendered ineffective.

An endpoint used during initial appliance setup did not require authentication and did not correctly enforce its intended state precondition, so during the initial activation window an unauthenticated network attacker could repeatedly re-trigger the privileged activation process. This could disrupt setup and leave the appliance in an incompletely configured state. The issue is only reachable while an appliance is being activated for the first time and not yet fully configured.

A SQL injection vulnerability existed in Kiteworks Secure Data Forms, where a value derived from the authenticated user's stored account data was incorporated into a database query without proper sanitization. An authenticated user could potentially influence that value to inject SQL. Exploitation requires an authenticated session and applies only to deployments where a specific optional feature is in use.

An authenticated administrator of Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway could submit a crafted serialized object to a cluster management interface that was deserialized without sufficient validation, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution in the context of the gateway service account. Exploitation requires an administrator account holding a specific queue-management privilege.

Kiteworks Core contains a business logic flaw in a Kiteworks file-request feature allowed an authenticated user to send a request that appeared to originate from another user, because the server did not verify that the requester was authorized to act as the specified account. This could be used to solicit files or information from a recipient under a trusted identity; exploitation requires the feature to be enabled for the attacker's profile and the targeted recipient to act on the request.